Illinois appellate court upholds district's $350 drivers' education fee  

An Illinois appellate court held that a district's $350 drivers' education course fee did not violate the free education clause of the Illinois Constitution or the School Code even though most of funds would be used to pay teachers' salaries.

In Sherman v. Township High School District No. 214, 15-year-old Dawn Sherman, through her father, Robert Sherman, brought a pro se complaint against the district and the State Board of Education, alleging that the fee was unlawful and seeking a temporary restraining order.

Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the fee violated the free education clause of the Illinois Constitution, which requires education to be free in public school through secondary level. Ill.  Const. 1970 art. X, § 1.

Plaintiff also asserted that ISBE had a duty to reject the district's request to waive the $50 limit on drivers' education course fees imposed in the School Code because the fees were used in part for staffing costs. Finally, plaintiff asserted that ISBE had a duty to determine the constitutionality of the district's waiver application, instead of just reviewing the application for completeness.

Section 27-33 of the School Code provides that the districts may charge a reasonable fee, not to exceed $50, to students who participate in its drivers' education course. 105 ILCS 5/27-33.

However, school districts may request a waiver of the mandates of the School Code under Section 2-3.25g. 105 ILCS 5/2-3.25g. The waiver provision also requires ISBE to "review applications and requests for completeness and […] compile the requests in reports to be filed with the General Assembly." Id.  

In addition, Section 252.30(a)(3) of the Illinois Administrative Code provides that a district may charge a reasonable fee to students who participate in its drivers' education course, not to exceed the amount in Section 27-33 of the School Code. 23 IL ADC § 252.30(a)(3). However, the fee shall not include salaries or benefits of school personnel. Id. Pursuant to section 2-3.25g of the School Code, the district filed its application to waive the $50 limit, which was subsequently approved by the General Assembly.

The trial judge dismissed the case with prejudice, finding that both ISBE and the district were not proper parties, because the case concerned the legality of a waiver expressly approved by the General Assembly.

The appellate court found the district to be a proper party, but affirmed the dismissal on other grounds. The court held free education clause did not bar the district from imposing a reasonable fee for an elective course, such as drivers' education. In addition, the fee was specifically authorized under Section 27-33 of the School Code.

The court also found ISBE was not a proper party, since it had no duty to review the district's waiver for anything other than completeness. ISBE's review did not require constitutionality determination of consideration of Section 252.30(a)(3) of the Administrative Code. Rather, the decision on the merits of the district's application waiver was to be made solely by the General Assembly.