Administrative law judge applied wrong standard in determining whether student was eligible for special education services under IDEA

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an administrative law judge applied the wrong standard in determining whether a child with Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome was eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act. In making her decision, the ALJ relied on the testimony of the child’s physician that the illness could adversely affect the child’s educational performance.    

The case involved, C.D., a student who was diagnosed with Ehlers-Danlos Syndrome, a genetic disease that caused the student to have poor upper body strength along with chronic and intermittent pain. After the diagnosis, an Individualized Education Program (IEP)was created involving adaptive physical education and supplemental aids and services in his academic classes.  

Upon the conclusion of C.D.’s fifth-grade year, the District’s IEP team determined after a reevaluation that C.D. was performing at grade level in his classes, had met many of the goals included in his IEP for gym, and that C.D.’s EDS no longer adversely affected his educational performance. The IEP team further found that C.D. was no longer in need of special education services, because his needs could be met in a regular education setting. The team instead decided to implement a health plan drafted by his physicians and the school nurse, which included restrictions and modifications for participation in gym class.  

C.D.’s parents thereafter sought and obtained administrative review of the team’s decision. The parents contended that he was entitled to special education because he could not perform all of the activities in gym class.  

The ALJ found for the parents, relying on the opinion of one of C.D.’s physicians that the EDS causes him to experience pain and fatigue, which “can affect his educational performance.” Based on the physician’s testimony, the ALJ found that C.D.’s ability to safely and fully perform and participate in certain activities at school, including regular P.E. class and recess, was adversely affected by his EDS. The federal district court affirmed.  

The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that the ALJ applied the wrong standard in determining whether C.D. was eligible for special education services. For a child to qualify as a student with a disability under the IDEA, he must have the an ailment listed in the statute. Although EDS was not specifically listed under the statute, it would qualify as an “other health impairment” where it manifests itself in a variety of ways and adversely affects the child’s educational performance. 34 C.F.R. 300.8(c)(9)(ii).  

The court then noted that the ALJ applied the incorrect standard. It noted that the standard “[was] not whether something, when considered in the abstract, can adversely affect a student’s educational performance, but whether in reality it does.” The court also noted there was no substantial evidence that supported the ALJ’s finding that C.D.’s EDS adversely affected his educational performance.   

Even if the ALJ did not err in finding that the EDS adversely affected C.D.’s educational performance, the IEP team needs to make a second determination as to whether the student requires special education. 20 U.S.C. 401(3)(A)(ii). The team determined that such services were not needed and that all of C.D.’s safety needs could be addressed through his health plan implemented through his regular gym class.  

The ALJ rejected the team’s finding and dismissed the opinion of C.D.’s adaptive P.E. teacher as “unreliable.” Instead, she credited the opinion of C.D.’s physician that C.D. needed special education because of safety concerns in gym class.  

The court found the ALJ’s reliance on the physician’s opinion on this point was improper, noting that “physicians cannot simply prescribe special education for a student.” Rather, this determination lied within the team’s discretion, because the IDEA dictates full review by an IEP team composed of parent, regular education teachers, special education teachers, and the representative of the local agency. 20 U.S.C. 1414(d)(3)(C).  

Finally, the court noted that the record was clear that C.D. would benefit from continued physical and occupational therapy. However, physical and occupational therapy are both related services used to give the a student the full benefit of from special education and do not stand alone as services the school must provide apart from special education.